

**Question for written answer E-000410/2026**  
**to the Commission**  
Rule 144  
**Christine Anderson (ESN)**

**Subject:** Distinction between foreign disinformation operations and domestic amplification

The Commission has identified Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), including Russian-linked operations commonly described as ‘troll factories’, as a real and persistent threat to democratic processes in the EU. The European External Action Service (EEAS) has described the typical *modus operandi* of such operations<sup>1</sup>, while the Commission has underlined that investigation and attribution remain within the competences of the Member States<sup>2</sup>.

EU-level responses increasingly operate through horizontal regulatory obligations imposed on platforms established in the EU, with indirect effects on the dissemination and visibility of lawful speech by EU citizens, including domestic actors amplifying content originating from abroad.

In the light of Articles 11 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principles of conferral and proportionality (Article 5 TEU), in particular where action is based on Article 114 TFEU:

1. Could the Commission explain which objective criteria it refers to in order to distinguish between regulatory measures countering external FIMI operations and measures whose practical effects influence the amplification or visibility of lawful content by domestic actors within the EU?
2. How does the Commission assess necessity and proportionality where the justification for intervention lies in FIMI, but the regulatory effects influence domestic political discourse?
3. What safeguards ensure that the scope and intensity of regulatory responses to disinformation are not indirectly escalated by broader geopolitical tensions or hostile conduct by non-EU countries in other policy domains?

Submitted: 2.2.2026

---

<sup>1</sup> EEAS report of January 2024 entitled, ‘2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats’; see also earlier EEAS FIMI threat reports describing tactics, techniques and procedures rather than actor-specific enforcement.

<sup>2</sup> See, inter alia, Commission answers to Written Questions E-003428/2022, E-000861/2025 and E-002651/2025, emphasising reliance on EEAS analysis and Member State competences for investigation and attribution.