

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-000861/25
to the Commission
Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)
(26 February 2025)**

Subject: Russian intelligence funding of a campaign against the Law and Justice Government and Russian lobbying in Brussels

In the light of findings made by Polish counterintelligence, expert analyses and the media reports ⁽¹⁾, I would like to draw the Commission's attention to the confirmed systematic acts of hybrid warfare being perpetrated by the Russian secret services against the Law and Justice Party ('PiS') government in Poland. Under the PiS tenure, Poland played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine and was effective in neutralising Russian sabotage and disruption operations. Evidence has recently come to light, including from court proceedings and counterintelligence operations, indicating that Russian intelligence financed campaigns attacking the government and President Andrzej Duda — including by promoting the vulgar slogan 'f*** PiS', the so-called 'eight asterisks' — in order to weaken the then Polish Government and destabilise the state.

Against this backdrop, the Commission's vulnerability to Russian manipulation raises serious concerns. One example is the defence of Russian spy Pavel Rubtsov in the Annual Rule of Law Report, as well as the lack of decisive steps taken to clarify this incident. The lobbying landscape in Brussels, which allows Russian influence to infiltrate EU decision-making structures, is a cause of concern. The Commission and the EEAS, while devoting significant attention and resources to analysing and combating Russian information manipulation and interference (FIMI), should be aware that Russia's attacks on the Polish Government were in line with the Kremlin's objectives and may have been inspired by Russian intelligence operations targeting Law and Justice.

Will the Commission conduct a comprehensive review of lobbying activities targeting the PiS government, including the Rubtsov case, especially in the face of evidence that Moscow has been financing such operations, and examine the links between these initiatives and other campaigns supporting Russian interests?

Submitted: 26.2.2025

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission
(23 April 2025)**

Russian malign influence, interference and attempts to manipulate take many forms, including accusations against specific Member States, such as in the case of Poland, which has been the target of Moscow's campaigns for many years, including with attempts to undermine political leaders, Polish policy and material support to Ukraine, as well as Poland's role in the EU.

The EU has been at the forefront of developing policies and tools to contribute to the Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference ⁽¹⁾ (FIMI).

Within the mandate of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Russian FIMI campaigns are monitored, analysed and exposed and findings are made public, including on the EUvsDisinfo ⁽²⁾ platform.

The Commission reiterates its position of strong condemnation of Russia's espionage, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns.

The Commission will further prepare a European Democracy Shield, which will include initiatives to help to counter foreign information manipulation and interference online.

It should be noted, however, that reviews or similar kinds of investigations of lobbying activities alleged of falling under the scope of FIMI are within the competence of the Member States.

The Commission nor EEAS does not comment on national criminal investigations and the administration of justice in the Member States.

¹ Programme: 'Czarno na białym' — Rabota w Polsce <https://tvn24.pl/go/programy,7/czarno-na-bialym-odcinki,11367/odcinek-2630,S00E2630,1584846>
⁽¹⁾ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en
⁽²⁾ <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/>