

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002081/25
to the Commission
Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)
(22 May 2025)**

Subject: Türkiye-gate

The EU's blatant disregard for Türkiye's violations of international law and the country's attacks on international peace remains inexplicable for all nations bordering Türkiye. Unfortunately, the methods employed by Türkiye — including by Diyanet, TİKA, TRT and Turkish banks within the EU — for 'influencing' EU policies need to be investigated.

Türkiye has been accused on numerous occasions of attempts to exert influence by means of illegal funding and political corruption at international level. In the US, the most recent and blatant example involved the Mayor of New York, Eric Adams. There has been a federal investigation into whether his election campaign in 2021 was illegally financed through persons with ties to the Turkish Government, with the digital devices of his associates also being seized. Furthermore, Michael Flynn, the former national security advisor to the US President, admitted that he had accepted payments to represent Turkish interests, which he had failed to declare as he advocated the extradition of Fethullah Gülen.

Türkiye has tried to exert influence through the unfair and illegal lobbying of diaspora organisations in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium.

Can the Commission therefore answer the following:

1. Does it consider that the above cases establish a framework of suspicious Turkish conduct at international level, or does it believe that the country has only attempted to influence the US and not the EU, for whatever reason?
2. What steps has it taken and what steps is it planning to take to detect Turkish corruption in the Commission and its bodies and agencies?

Submitted: 22.5.2025

**Answer given by Ms Kos on behalf of the European Commission
(6 August 2025)**

The Commission is aware of public reports concerning foreign influence operations in various countries.

The Commission has put in place a comprehensive set of preventive and investigative mechanisms to combat fraud and corruption, including stringent internal controls, regular audits, transparency rules, and cooperation with bodies such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor's Office.

The EU Security Union Strategy ⁽¹⁾ recognises 'hybrid threats' as including a mixture of coercive and subversive activity by state or non-state actors aimed at influencing public opinion and policy while remaining below the threshold of declared warfare.

This encompasses illicit streams of funding, political corruption and manipulation of diaspora networks to sway decision-making both inside and outside the EU.

The ProtectEU Internal Security Strategy ⁽²⁾ establishes a pan-EU, country-neutral framework — mainstreaming security impact assessments into all Commission policy-making, enhancing cross-agency anti-money laundering and anti-fraud cooperation (the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, OLAF, the EU Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, and the EU Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation) and underpinning a harmonised anti-corruption directive — to detect and counter any illicit foreign or domestic influence, including that alleged of Türkiye.

The Commission remains vigilant to any analogous attempts to influence EU policy through covert funding or corruption channels, including via foreign broadcasters, cultural agencies or financial institutions operating in Member States.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2020) 605 final.

⁽²⁾ COM(2025) 148 final.