

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002097/25**  
**to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**  
**Michał Dworczyk (ECR)**  
(26 May 2025)

*Subject:* The key role of transatlantic cooperation in ensuring military mobility during the war in Ukraine

Almost a decade has passed since the EU turned its attention towards military mobility. However, the plans have not been backed up by funding. Poland and other countries on the eastern flank have repeatedly emphasised that transport infrastructure is an integral part of the security architecture.

The events of 2022 confirmed this diagnosis. Military mobility has become a key element of the West's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The United States has played a particularly important role, rapidly redeploying its armed forces to Central and Eastern Europe and actively supporting Ukraine through arms deliveries and effective coordination of logistics routes. Only thanks to American logistical capabilities, military reserves and efficient command was possible to act quickly and effectively strengthen security in the region.

The war in Ukraine has tested many of the assumptions underlying EU strategies. In practice, it was the Member States, NATO and the US that played a crucial role in responding to the crisis. My country has become a key hub for supporting Ukraine and European security.

In light of the above:

1. When planning new EU policies in the areas of defence policy and military mobility, does the Commission take into account the role played by the United States in the first weeks of the war in Ukraine?
2. In the event of a new security crisis, would the EU today be able to carry out a large-scale deployment of troops and equipment on its own, without US support?
3. In light of recent experiences and operational realities, is the requirement for a high percentage of EU-sourced components in the defence initiatives proposed by the Commission a realistic and strategically responsible approach towards allies who have proven to be crucial in times of crisis?

Submitted: 26.5.2025

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission**  
(8 August 2025)

The EU and the High Representative/Vice-President acknowledge the critical role of the United States (US) in providing essential support to Ukraine, including military aid, intelligence sharing, and logistical support, in close cooperation with the EU and Member States and many likeminded countries, notably through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for the EU to boost its defence readiness. By taking greater responsibility, the EU responds to calls for Europe to play a stronger role in its own defence.

The European Council, in its conclusions of 6 March <sup>(1)</sup> and 26 June 2025 <sup>(2)</sup>, stressed the need for greater sovereignty, reduced strategic dependencies, and better capabilities to act autonomously, while complementing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and contributing positively to global and transatlantic security.

Military mobility is a key priority, as outlined in the joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030 <sup>(3)</sup>. A Military Mobility Package will be adopted by year-end.

The ongoing participation of non-EU NATO allies, including the US, in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) <sup>(4)</sup> project on military mobility brings significant added transatlantic value.

Initiatives like SAFE (Security Action for Europe) <sup>(5)</sup> and the ReArm Europe Plan <sup>(6)</sup> do not only strengthen Europe's industrial base but also create opportunities to deepen and elevate cooperation with transatlantic and other international partners.

<sup>(1)</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/06/european-council-conclusions-on-european-defence/>.

<sup>(2)</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/06/26/european-council-conclusions-26-june-2025/>.

<sup>(3)</sup> [https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019\\_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readiness%202030.pdf](https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6d5db69-e0ab-4bec-9dc0-3867b4373019_en?filename=White%20paper%20for%20European%20defence%20%E2%80%93%20Readiness%202030.pdf).

<sup>(4)</sup> <https://www.pesco.europa.eu/>.

<sup>(5)</sup> [https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6d6f889c-e58d-4caa-8f3b-8b93154fe206\\_en?filename=SAFE%20Regulation.pdf](https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6d6f889c-e58d-4caa-8f3b-8b93154fe206_en?filename=SAFE%20Regulation.pdf).

<sup>(6)</sup> [https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en).

This approach enables the EU to increase its own capabilities while simultaneously promoting interoperability and shared security with partners, including NATO allies. In doing so, it helps build a sustainable and resilient security architecture that serves both European and transatlantic interests.

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