

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002236/25
to the Commission
Christine Anderson (ESN)
(4 June 2025)

Subject: EU response to Hamas-led information manipulation in the EU

Hamas, a designated terrorist organisation under EU law, regularly deploys emotionally charged narratives, staged or decontextualised imagery and strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion and pressuring EU policymakers. This aligns with the core definition of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) — namely, coordinated manipulation intended to deceive and influence democratic discourse.

1. In the light of the Commission's stated commitment to countering FIMI, can the Commission explain why it has not publicly identified, exposed or addressed Hamas's clear attempts to influence the European information environment?
2. If the Commission can act swiftly in cases of so-called disinformation spread by European citizens — often leading to pressure on platforms, content labelling or regulatory scrutiny — why has there been no corresponding action or attribution concerning Hamas's influence efforts, particularly following recent escalations in the Middle East?
3. Does the Commission recognise Hamas's strategic communication as a FIMI threat, and if so, what steps will it take to counter this actor's manipulation of EU audiences?

Submitted: 4.6.2025

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission
(24 July 2025)

The EU and its Member States have developed a foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) toolbox, endorsed by the European Council in 2023 ⁽¹⁾, which outlines options, including for Member States, to tackle threats by FIMI actors.

In its monitoring of information environments in the Middle East and North Africa region, the European External Action Service has consistently reported to EU institutions, bodies and agencies and Member States about acts and actors of manipulation.

The Terrorist Content Online Regulation ⁽²⁾ allows Member States to issue removal orders on terrorist content disseminated online in the context of the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023.

For example, the implementation report of 14 February 2024 ⁽³⁾ under the regulation shows that after the attack of 7 October 2023, the German competent authority issued several removal orders targeting terrorist content online related to Hamas.

In addition, the EU has strong common rules for online platforms and Member States to stop the dissemination of terrorist and violent content online.

Under the Digital Services Act ⁽⁴⁾ and its Code of conduct on hate speech, very large online platforms are obligated to assess and mitigate systemic risks on their platforms, including risks related to illegal content and civic discourse, such as those stemming from FIMI.

Such obligations do not relate to specific content or narratives, but rather to risks of a systemic nature and the relevant processes put in place by the platform.

⁽¹⁾ Council conclusions of 15 December 2023, EUCO 20/23.

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EU) 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online, OJ L 172, 17.5.2021.

⁽³⁾ Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online, COM/2024/64 final.

⁽⁴⁾ Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act).