

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-004532/25
to the Commission
Moritz Körner (Renew)
(13 November 2025)**

Subject: Central Asian countries

1. How have exports from the European Union as a whole and from each Member State to the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) evolved since February 2022?
2. How does the Commission explain and assess this evolution, particularly in regard to possible indirect trade flows to Russia and the effectiveness of EU sanctions regimes?
3. What concrete measures has the Commission taken to prevent or stop apparent or potential circumvention of sanctions against Russia by going through those countries? How successful have those measures been?

Submitted: 13.11.2025

**Answer given by Ms Albuquerque on behalf of the European Commission
(3 February 2026)**

Strengthening legitimate trade and investment ties is an essential part of the EU-Central Asia Strategy ⁽¹⁾. EU trade with the region increased from EUR 27.9 billion (2021) to EUR 54.3 billion (2024) driven mainly by a rise in EU imports. EU exports to the five Central Asian countries increased from EUR 9.1 billion (2021) to EUR 19.1 billion (2024).

Preventing sanctions circumvention is a priority. The Commission has focused efforts on preventing re-export of EU-origin Common High Priority (CHP) items ⁽²⁾ considered vital for Russia's war effort.

The Commission monitors trade flows of these items from the EU to Central Asia and their potential re-exports to Russia. The EU Sanctions Envoy regularly engages with Central Asian countries where suspicious trade flows have been identified, notably Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

This engagement has led the countries to adopt measures to address circumvention. Trade data shows that after the peaks observed between the end of 2022 and mid-2023, there has been a significant decrease in the export of CHP items from these countries to Russia ⁽³⁾.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 ⁽⁴⁾ contains several anti-circumvention measures: prohibition to circumvent sanctions; due diligence requirements; obligation for EU operators to contractually prohibit re-exportation to and use in Russia of sensitive items.

Additionally, operators and individuals based in third countries facilitating circumvention may be listed in Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 ⁽⁵⁾ or (EU) No 833/2014.

For example, the EU imposed ⁽⁶⁾ a transaction ban on several financial institutions based in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that were facilitating sanctions circumvention. This work continues and the EU will take action when necessary.

⁽¹⁾ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_-_the_eu_and_central_asia_-_new_opportunities_for_a_stronger_partnership.pdf.

⁽²⁾ CHP items : https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/5a2494db-d874-4e2b-bf2a-ec5a191d2dc0_en?filename=list-common-high-priority-items_en.pdf.

⁽³⁾ The combined export from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan of CHP items to Russia fell by 32% during the first 4 months of 2025, as compared with the 2023 average (when it reached all time high).

⁽⁴⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj/eng>.

⁽⁵⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/269/oj>.

⁽⁶⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2033/oj>.