

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-001732/26
to the Commission
Sandro Ruotolo (S&D), Nicola Zingaretti (S&D)
(28 April 2026)**

Subject: Meta ‘elections operations centers’

Meta Platforms has stated that during election periods, it activates structures known as ‘elections operations centers’, dedicated to monitoring the integrity of information and combating disinformation and coordinated interference.

For the Italian elections (2018, 2022) and the 2024 European elections, the company has indicated the use of interdisciplinary teams, including former members of US intelligence services, however, without making key details public such as selection criteria, the chain of command and operational procedures. At the same time, independent analyses have shown significant variations in the visibility of political content during election periods.

The Commission is therefore asked:

1. Does it possess information on the structure, functioning and oversight mechanisms of the ‘elections operations centers’ set up by Meta in the EU and whether these practices comply with the transparency obligations laid down in the Digital Services Act?
2. Does it intend to examine the role of staff with previous experience in security or intelligence in the definition and application of policies on political content?
3. Will the ongoing investigation into the visibility of political content online include a specific assessment of the impact, at Union level, of moderation and ranking systems during the 2024 European elections?

Submitted: 28.4.2026

**Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission
(1 July 2026)**

The Commission is aware of Meta setting up election operations centres in the EU as part of its internal operational structures. According to Meta, these centres have been designed to monitor and respond to threats during election periods, including disinformation campaigns and coordinated inauthentic behaviour ⁽¹⁾.

The Digital Services Act ⁽²⁾ (DSA) obliges providers of very large online platforms (VLOPs) like Meta to diligently identify, assess and analyse the systemic risks stemming from their services and put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective measures to mitigate such risks. Those include any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes.

The DSA provides a non-exhaustive list of mitigation measures that providers of VLOPs and very large online search engines may adopt.

The Commission’s Election Guidelines ⁽³⁾ further elaborates on that list and sets out best practices and recommendations for providers, specifically for risks related to electoral processes, and also covering staff expertise. The Commission will not hesitate to use its enforcement powers under the DSA if suspicions of non-compliance arise.

As mentioned, the Commission initiated proceedings against Meta in relation to the suspicion that it demotes political content in its recommender systems, including the feeds, of Facebook and Instagram ⁽⁴⁾.

The investigation focuses on the compatibility of Meta’s policy concerning political content with the DSA transparency and user redress obligations, as well as the aforementioned obligations.

In this context, the Commission has sent several requests for information to Meta. At this stage, the Commission cannot comment further on specific aspects of the ongoing investigation.

⁽¹⁾ <https://about.fb.com/news/2024/02/how-meta-is-preparing-for-the-eus-2024-parliament-elections/>.

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EU) 2022/2065: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng>.

⁽³⁾ Communication from the Commission C/2024/3014, 26.4.2024.

⁽⁴⁾ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2373.