

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002128/26
to the Commission
Alvise Pérez (NI)
(24 May 2026)**

Subject: Appointment of the Governor of the Bank of Spain and safeguards for central bank independence

On 4 September 2024, the Spanish Government announced that José Luis Escrivá, then Minister for Digital Transformation and the Civil Service, would be put forward as Governor of the Bank of Spain. The Bank of Spain's own website states that he served as a minister between 2020 and 2024 and has been Governor since 2024, while also sitting on the Governing Council and General Council of the European Central Bank. A popular Spanish television channel reported that no serving minister had previously been appointed Governor of the Bank of Spain in democratic Spain.

Without questioning the Member States' formal power to appoint national central bank governors, this immediate transition from the Council of Ministers to a national central bank participating in the Eurosystem and banking supervision framework raises serious concerns about independence, institutional confidence and safeguards against partisan capture. Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires that national central banks and their decision-makers be free from government influence.

1. Does the Commission consider that appointments without a cooling-off period may undermine the practical effectiveness of Article 130 TFEU and the independence guarantees of the European System of Central Banks?
2. Will the Commission request information from Spain on the safeguards applied in this appointment?
3. Will the Commission assess EU-wide minimum standards on cooling-off periods, transparency and conflicts of interest for national central bank appointments?

Submitted: 25.5.2026

**Answer given by Mr Dombrovskis on behalf of the European Commission
(27 July 2026)**

Institutional independence is reflected in Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ⁽¹⁾ and Article 7 of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank Statute ⁽²⁾.

The Treaty's requirement of central bank independence is linked to the primary objective of price stability, which is best served by a fully independent institution with a clearly defined mandate. In this context, institutional independence in relation to Governors of national central banks is a critical component of central bank independence.

The Commission would note that these Articles do not provide any specific requirements regarding the appointment of the Governor.

Member States are, therefore, competent to set the conditions required for such appointments, provided that they do not conflict with the features of central bank independence, as stated in the Treaty.

Notably, once appointed, what needs to be assessed is whether the legal framework and the safeguards in place ensure that the Governor can exercise the mandate independently of any political influence.

The Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, will continue to monitor whether the Governors of ESCB central banks exercise their mandate free from political influence.

⁽¹⁾ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/art_130/oj/eng.

⁽²⁾ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2016/pro_4/oj/eng.