

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002140/26
to the Commission
Dolors Montserrat (PPE)
(26 May 2026)**

Subject: Risks linked to public contracts awarded to Huawei in Spanish critical infrastructure

As part of the investigation into the alleged corruption scheme, influence peddling and irregular awarding of contracts in the Ministry led by Óscar Puente and around former president José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, irregularities have now come to light in connection with a public contract of an estimated value of EUR 400 000, awarded to Huawei Technologies by ADIF for railway data networks of the General Railway Network. ⁽¹⁾

Given the repeated warnings from EU institutions about the risks associated with high-risk technology providers and the need to reduce strategic dependency on third countries such as China, especially on critical infrastructure:

1. Has the Commission requested information from the Spanish Government on all contracts awarded to Huawei in the strategic transport and telecommunications sectors?
2. Does the Commission consider it compatible with the European objectives of risk reduction and economic security for public entities responsible for critical infrastructure to continue awarding sensitive technology contracts to suppliers considered to be high-risk?

Submitted: 26.5.2026

**Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission
(10 August 2026)**

The Commission has not requested information from the Spanish Government on contracts awarded to Huawei in the transport and telecommunications sectors and does not comment on procurement decisions within the remit of national authorities.

The Commission's concerns with respect to high-risk suppliers in the telecommunications sector are clearly expressed in its communication on the implementation of the EU 5G cybersecurity Toolbox ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission assessed that Huawei (and ZTE) presents materially higher risks than other 5G suppliers. The Commission considered that Member States' decisions to restrict or exclude these suppliers from 5G networks are justified and compliant with the 5G Toolbox.

The Joint Communication on strengthening economic security ⁽²⁾ also recognised the risk of disruption of the EU's critical infrastructure by foreign actors, outlining among the objectives in this area the limitation of ownership/control/operation by high-risk entities of EU critical infrastructure and the limitation of dependencies on single suppliers or high-risk suppliers.

To overcome the diversity of approaches across Member States, the proposal for a revised Cybersecurity Act ⁽³⁾ proposes, among other things, the mandatory de-risking of European mobile and fixed electronic communications networks from high-risk suppliers in key information and communication technology assets, building on the work already carried out under the Toolbox.

Through this proposal, the Commission sends a clear and strong signal that the EU can no longer afford to jeopardise its security and the security of its most critical infrastructure by being dependent on untrusted suppliers.

¹ <https://www.abc.es/espana/boe-publico-nochebuena-contrato-huawei-udef-vincula-20260527011956-nt.html>

⁽¹⁾ C(2023) 4049 final.

⁽²⁾ JOIN(2025) 977 final.

⁽³⁾ COM(2026) 11 final.