

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002695/26
to the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Nikolaos Anadiotis (NI)
(29 June 2026)

Subject: Exports of European military material to Türkiye and implementation of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP

Common Position 2008/944/CFSP lays down common criteria for exports of military technology and equipment, including Criterion Four on the preservation of regional peace, security and stability ⁽¹⁾. Nonetheless, Türkiye continues to occupy 37% of the Republic of Cyprus ⁽²⁾, has maintained since 1995 a threat of war against Greece if it exercises its legitimate sovereign rights in the Aegean ⁽³⁾, and has a military presence or involvement in Syria, Iraq and Libya ⁽⁴⁾.

Notwithstanding the above, EU Member States are either authorising or considering military exports or defence partnerships with Türkiye, including through programmes such as Eurofighter and related European defence partnerships ⁽⁵⁾.

In light of the above, I would like to ask the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy the following:

1. How does she assess the compatibility of exports of military material to Türkiye with Criterion Four of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP?
2. Does she intend to ask Member States to review export authorisations to Türkiye, given that there is a risk of equipment being used against Member States or in destabilising operations?
3. Will she propose a coordinated European stance calling for the suspension of exports of military material to Türkiye until the country withdraws its *casus belli* and fully respects the sovereignty of Greece and Cyprus?

Submitted: 30.6.2026

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Kallas on behalf of the European Commission
(27 August 2026)

The control of arms exports by Member States is subject, *inter alia* ⁽¹⁾, to Council Common Position (CP) 2008/944/CFSP ⁽²⁾. Under Article 2(5)(b), when assessing export licence applications, they must consider the risk of use of the items against their forces or those of other Member States, as well as friendly and allied countries.

This also includes the potential export of the Eurofighter, which is subject to the unanimous approval of state participants of the project.

The Commission has no mandate to influence Member States' decisions in individual cases regarding their arms export authorisation. Member States work within the Common Foreign and Security Policy framework to promote convergence in arms exports. The Council's Working Party on Conventional Arms Export continues to examine arms exports to Türkiye.

The EU has repeatedly stressed that Türkiye must respect the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all Member States. The High Representative/Vice-President reiterated this message in the press conference of the Foreign Affairs Council on 13 July 2026 ⁽³⁾.

The EU also underlined its expectations that Türkiye fully respects international law, to de-escalate tensions in the interest of regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to promote good neighbourly relations in a sustainable way ⁽⁴⁾.

The Council has noted the improvements in relations between Türkiye and Greece expecting them to be sustained, as well as the de-escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean ⁽⁵⁾.

¹ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944>

² https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/1a2_en.htm

³ <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/greece-says-turkey-must-lift-war-threat-get-access-eu-defence-funds-2025-05-22/>

⁴ <https://www.cats-network.eu/visualisations/visualising-turkeys-foreign-policy-activism-2025>

⁵ <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/germany-oks-eurofighter-delivery-turkey-spiegel-reports-2025-07-23/>.

⁽¹⁾ This includes also national legislation and the Arms Trade Treaty, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253.

⁽²⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944>.

⁽³⁾ https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representative-kaja-kallas-press-conference-2_en?channel=eeas_press_alerts&date=2026-07-13&newsid=0&langid=en&source=mail.

⁽⁴⁾ This was stressed by the European Council conclusions of June 2022, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/24/european-council-conclusions-23-24-june-2022/>, p.7.

⁽⁵⁾ <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf>.

The Council Conclusions of 14 October 2019 ⁽⁶⁾ recall the decision of some Member States to halt arms exports to Türkiye. Member States committed to strong national positions based on the CP, including strict application of criterion 4 on regional stability, but did not impose an arms embargo. There has been no subsequent proposal to further restrict arms exports to Türkiye.

⁽⁶⁾ <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13090-2019-INIT/en/pdf>.