

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002774/26
to the Commission
Jean-Paul Garraud (Pfe)
(3 July 2026)**

Subject: End of right to veto: will Member States be forced to comply?

A number of proposals for EU reform aim to replace the unanimity rule — which requires unanimous agreement from all Member States — with qualified majority voting in particularly sensitive areas like foreign policy, taxation and certain defence issues.

In practice, this means that a decision could be adopted even if multiple Member States are opposed to it, provided that a majority of Member States, representing a significant proportion of the EU population, are in favour. This change would profoundly alter the current balance between the Member States and the European institutions.

A country could thus be forced to apply a decision that it had in fact rejected, including in areas that directly affect its essential national interests.

1. Does the Commission wish to abolish Member States' right to veto in certain areas and, if so, which areas?
2. Can it guarantee that no Member State will be deprived of its right to veto without an official amendment to the Treaties and without the agreement of the Member States in accordance with their national laws?
3. Before any reforms are made, will it publish a clear study explaining the powers that each Member State will lose and the decisions which could then be imposed on them?

Submitted: 3.7.2026

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the European Commission
(9 September 2026)**

1. The Commission's longstanding position, reiterated by the President of the Commission in her State of the Union address in September 2025 ⁽¹⁾, is that, if the EU wants to act quickly, efficiently, and therefore strategically, unanimity voting ought to be reconsidered in certain policy areas. These include tax policy, social policy, energy and climate policy and aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
2. The move away from unanimity can be achieved through Treaty change or the activation of the passerelle clauses provided for in the EU Treaties. In any case a move away from unanimity depends on the agreement of all Member States.
3. The Commission has already set out detailed considerations in Communications from 2018 ⁽²⁾, 2019 ⁽³⁾ and 2024 ⁽⁴⁾. The Commission believes it is possible to move away from unanimity without putting at risk Member States strategic interests. This can be done by combining the activation of passerelle clauses with appropriate and proportionate safeguards to accommodate strategic national interests.

⁽¹⁾ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_25_2053.

⁽²⁾ Communication on a stronger global actor: a more efficient decision-making for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, COM(2018) 647 final.

⁽³⁾ See Communications 'Towards a more efficient and democratic decision making in EU tax policy', COM(2019) 8; 'A more efficient and democratic decision making in EU energy and climate policy', COM(2019) 177; and 'More efficient decision making in social policy: Identification of areas for an enhanced move to qualified majority voting', COM(2019) 186.

⁽⁴⁾ Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews, COM(2024) 146 final.