

(English version)

Question for written answer E-003251/26
to the Commission
Ioan-Rareş Bogdan (PPE)
(11 August 2026)

Subject: Shortcomings in the application of the Digital Services Act in cases where disinformation goes viral pose a risk to citizens' safety

The viral spread of videos on TikTok containing serious disinformation poses a threat to public order. In recent days, an urban legend about a 'black ambulance that abducts children' led to an ambulance crew being attacked in Romania.

While very large online platforms are obliged under Articles 34 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 to assess and mitigate systemic risks, current reactive moderation systems are proving slow and unable to stop public panic from spreading within a matter of hours.

In view of this lack of effectiveness, can the Commission answer the following:

1. Does the Commission intend, through practical guidelines or delegated acts, to clarify binding time standards for human moderation and the removal of content inciting violence against essential public services?
2. Bearing in mind that recommendation algorithms are clearly partly to blame in that they actively amplify disinformation for engagement, what specific measures is the Commission considering to force the temporary shutdown of profiling-based feeds in areas affected by public psychosis?
3. Is the Commission considering a proposal to revise the regulation in order to stamp out these shortcomings after presenting an assessment of the practical limits of the Digital Services Act in stopping high-speed disinformation?

Submitted: 11.8.2026

Answer given by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen on behalf of the European Commission
(12 October 2026)

The Commission takes concerns about the rapid dissemination of misleading or false information seriously and recognises that such activities may have real-life consequences.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) ⁽¹⁾ does not prescribe specific mitigation measures for very large online platforms (VLOPs) and very large search engines (VLOSEs) following the risk assessment, but requires them to put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective mitigation measures, tailored to the specific systemic risks identified.

While the Commission does not intend to introduce binding time standards for human moderation and the removal of content, nothing in the DSA prevents VLOPs and VLOSEs from introducing such standards for specific types of violative content.

Signatories of the Code of Conduct on Disinformation ⁽²⁾, including TikTok, have committed to minimise the risks of viral propagation of disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their services and by increasing transparency of their recommender systems to users.

Moreover, the Commission constantly monitors VLOPs' compliance with the DSA and may open investigations when necessary. For instance, the Commission is investigating TikTok's assessment and mitigation of systemic risks related to civic discourse and electoral processes stemming from the intentional manipulation of its services, including its recommender systems ⁽³⁾.

In this context, the DSA already provides for an obligation on VLOPs and VLOSEs to introduce at least one recommender system not based on profiling.

⁽¹⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj/eng>.

⁽²⁾ <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/code-conduct-disinformation>.

⁽³⁾ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6487.