

(English version)

**Priority question for written answer P-004849/25
to the Commission
Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE)
(8 December 2025)**

Subject: Andrej Babiš's conflict of interest

In 2019, DG AGRI conducted an audit of agricultural subsidies in the Czech Republic in relation to a conflict of interest concerning the then-Prime Minister Andrej Babiš. The Czech Republic received the final audit report in 2022. The Commission concluded that agricultural subsidies had been allocated to the Agrofert group in violation of European and Czech conflict of interest rules. Commissioner Piotr Serafin announced at a CONT Committee hearing that the Commission would address Andrej Babiš's conflict of interest.

Meanwhile, Andrej Babiš announced that he would resolve his conflict of interest by transferring Agrofert to a blind trust, which would expire after his death, with ownership of Agrofert then being transferred to his children. The Czech legal system does not recognise the concept of a blind trust. Moreover, the beneficiaries of this arrangement are to be Andrej Babiš's children. As Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš still has an interest in the profits of the Agrofert group.

In this connection:

1. Will Andrej Babiš find himself in a situation of conflict of interest under European rules after he becomes Prime Minister? Can it be said that the interests of his children and the public interest may be in conflict?
2. Would the drawing of non-entitlement (e.g., investment) and entitlement-based subsidies by the Agrofert group be contrary to Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018?

Submitted: 8.12.2025

**Answer given by Mr Hansen on behalf of the European Commission
(22 January 2026)**

All Member States are required to respect the provisions of the EU Treaties and the legislation based on them, including the provisions related to the management of conflict of interests and in particular Article 61 of the Financial Regulation ⁽¹⁾.

Under this Article, persons and authorities involved in the EU budget implementation must not take any action which may bring their own interests into conflict with those of the Union.

They must also take appropriate measures to prevent a conflict of interests from arising in the functions under their responsibility and to address situations which may objectively be perceived as a conflict of interests ⁽²⁾.

Under the Conditionality Regulation ⁽³⁾, failing to ensure the absence of conflicts of interest with respect to the proper functioning of the authorities implementing the EU budget may be indicative of a breach of the principles of the rule of law. This regulation applies to all EU funds ⁽⁴⁾.

The Commission counts on the Czech Republic to keep on ensuring the respect of these principles and rules and remains vigilant in protecting the Union's financial interests.

It carefully monitors the situation in all Member States, including the Czech Republic, to assess whether the conditions for triggering the tools at its disposal to protect the Union's financial interests are met.

The Commission will appropriately follow up on any conflict of interest that has not been resolved in line with the requirements of the Financial Regulation, in order to protect the Union budget.

⁽¹⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32024R2509&qid=1729499536269>.

⁽²⁾ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2021.121.01.0001.01.ENG.

⁽³⁾ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj/eng>.

⁽⁴⁾ including EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development) and EAGF (European Agricultural Guarantee Fund).