



Plenary sitting

B10-0449/2026

5.10.2026

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the 2026 undemocratic elections to the Russian State Duma and their implications for civil society
(2026/2907(RSP))

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on behalf of the ECR Group

**European Parliament resolution on the 2026 undemocratic elections to the Russian State Duma and their implications for civil society
(2026/2907(RSP))**

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine,
 - having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
 - having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights,
 - having regard to the UN Charter and the principles of international law concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states,
 - having regard to the statement of 21 September 2026 by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Russian State Duma elections held on 18–20 September 2026 and their non-applicability on Ukrainian territory,
 - having regard to the statement of 6 August 2026 by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on the Russian Federation’s refusal to invite OSCE observers,
 - having regard to the statements of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) concerning the 2026 Russian parliamentary elections,
 - having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the sham elections to the Russian State Duma were held from 18 to 20 September; whereas they were held in an unequivocally authoritarian environment, characterised by structural censorship and systematic denial of political pluralism, freedom of expression, freedom of speech and media freedom;
- B. whereas the Russian authorities continue to use legislative, administrative and judicial measures to exclude any democratic opposition from participating in the country’s political life, through, among other things, the designation of individuals and organisations as ‘foreign agents’ and ‘extremists’, arrests, and restrictions on candidates, campaign financing, and independent electoral monitoring;
- C. whereas the Russian authorities has removed the opposition party Yabloko – the only registered political party openly opposing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine – from ballots for State Duma elections following politically motivated accusations of copyright infringements, extremism, and other fabricated misconduct; whereas this decision has left only government-controlled and regime-loyal opposition on electoral ballots, amounting to a total of 10 political parties – the fewest in the history of elections to the State Duma; whereas on 17 August 2026, supporters of Yabloko gathered outside the Supreme Court in Moscow as it considered the party’s appeal

against the exclusion of its federal list from the State Duma elections; whereas this protest constituted virtually the only visible manifestation of public opposition inside Russia in the context of the elections and was immediately suppressed by the authorities, with more than 70 participants reportedly detained; whereas Yabloko deputy chair Lev Shlosberg was sentenced to 11 years and one month in prison a week after the party's exclusion;

- D. whereas, on 28 September 2026, the Council had already imposed restrictive measures against 10 Russian officials for their exclusion of Yabloko, emphasising the continued increase in systematic, institutionalised internal and transnational repression at the hands of the Russian authorities; whereas these 10 officials included three judges of the Supreme Court, and an official in the Prosecutor General's Office;
- E. whereas the elections were conducted during Russia's ongoing illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which has fundamentally affected the political and legal environment in the Russian Federation and has been accompanied by further repression of domestic dissent;
- F. whereas the Russian authorities organised quasi-voting in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including Crimea and temporarily occupied parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions; whereas such quasi-voting constitutes a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and has no validity under international law; whereas the staging of electoral processes in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine is part of Russia's broader attempt to consolidate its illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories, legitimise its illegal, unprovoked full-scale invasion, and erase Ukrainian statehood;
- G. whereas among the members of the new State Duma are 46 individuals who either served in the Russian invasion forces in Ukraine or held posts in the occupation administrations, representing more than 10 % of the State Duma's members; whereas this further demonstrates the growing militarisation not only of Russian society, but also of political life and state institutions; whereas among them is Nursultan Mussagaleev, who is the subject of a Ukrainian arrest warrant for allegedly ordering the torture and execution of a civilian near Bucha in 2022; whereas a suspected war criminal now holds a seat in Russia's legislature;
- H. whereas Russia opened 10 polling points at border crossings with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, four in Kaliningrad, five in Pskov oblast and one in Leningrad oblast, alongside polling stations in its diplomatic missions in the EU;
- I. whereas the Russian authorities have continued to criminalise peaceful criticism of the war of aggression against Ukraine and have prosecuted political opponents, journalists, human rights defenders and civil society representatives;
- J. whereas the Russian Federation deliberately and repeatedly denied access to international observers by refusing to invite the OSCE/ODIHR or the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to observe the elections, despite commitments under the 1990 Copenhagen Document; whereas the OSCE has described this as part of a continuing pattern of disregard for Russia's international commitments;

- K. whereas no legitimate, independent domestic election observers were present either following the forced dissolution of Golos, the country's leading independent election-monitoring group, and the imprisonment of its co-chair, Grigory Melkonyants; whereas instead, in a bid to claim legitimacy, Russian authorities opted to manufacture a sham, fake electoral observation ecosystem with recruited individuals praising the process while voting was still underway with no evidence at hand; whereas days after the elections, and after publicly denouncing the electoral fraud, Alexander Kynev, one of Russia's leading political scientists specialising in regional governance and elections, was arrested by Russia's Federal Security Service, the FSB, under fabricated, politically motivated drug charges; whereas he has since been hospitalised with leg fractures sustained while in custody; whereas Mr Kynev had estimated that, without fraud, turnout would have been around 40 % and United Russia's result would have been no higher than 35 %;
- L. whereas electronic voting and other forms of remote voting have been expanded in Russia in the absence of independent scrutiny of electoral procedures, highlighting the lack of transparency of the electoral process and paving the way for electoral fraud; whereas this year's elections saw the introduction of Russia's new vote-tabulation system, GAS Vybery 2.0; whereas vulnerabilities in this system have been reported, including users' direct access to voter lists, which allows for the inflation of the number of participants;
- M. whereas countless cases of electoral fraud in numerous forms have been reported; whereas such cases included, but were not limited to, ballot stuffing, ballot manipulation during counting, multiple entries in the voter register bearing identical signatures, pre-filled ballots during both in-person and remote voting, unnatural electronic voting patterns, and implausibly regular voter distributions;
- N. whereas independent analysts estimate that between 14 and 25 million votes for United Russia were fabricated, that actual turnout was below 40 % rather than the official 59.8 %, and that United Russia's real support stood at around 37 % rather than the official 58 %;
- O. whereas all of the above demonstrates that elections in Russia, understood as a mechanism for democratic decision-making and peaceful alternation of power, did not take place and do not exist, and merely serve as a tool to legitimise, prolong, entrench and institutionalise the current political order; whereas as such, the results of elections to the State Duma are illegitimate and the electoral process itself should not be regarded as anything more than performative political theatre;
- P. whereas hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens have left Russia since the start of its full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas, nevertheless, participation in Kremlin-organised voting abroad remained remarkably limited, highlighting the widespread political apathy and strikingly low level of public mobilisation against the Kremlin among Russians living abroad; whereas Russian democratic forces abroad will be credible partners only if they unambiguously support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, accountability and reparations;

1. Does not recognise the legitimacy of the so-called State Duma elections or their announced results; stresses that, in the absence of any political competition and fundamental political freedoms, the vote cannot be regarded as a democratic election and amounted instead to a plebiscite organised by the Kremlin to demonstrate support for the regime and its war of aggression against Ukraine; emphasises that all electoral procedures in Russia have the nature of a complete façade and notes their active use by the Russian authorities for propaganda purposes;
2. Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to refrain from any official contact with the newly constituted State Duma and its members, to oppose their participation in interparliamentary assemblies, and to consider null any act of this Duma purporting to legislate for, annex or ratify the status of occupied Ukrainian territory;
3. Highlights the undemocratic nature of the staged electoral process, devoid of fundamental political freedoms, genuine competition and internationally recognised electoral standards and observers; considers it to be a ritualistic performance for the Putin regime aimed at manufacturing the appearance of democratic consent for the legitimisation and continuation of the Kremlin's domestic repression, militarisation and war of aggression against Ukraine;
4. Condemns the systematic coercion of voters, including state employees and military personnel, the physical intimidation documented at polling stations and the mass exclusion of observers, including some 250 Yabloko-nominated observers in St Petersburg alone;
5. Condemns Russia's deliberate decision to block ODIHR and OSCE election monitoring missions, demonstrating the blatant disregard for international obligations and lack of any independent scrutiny of the staged electoral process;
6. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the organisation of the staged electoral process in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including Crimea and the temporarily occupied parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions; stresses that this constitutes an additional violation of international law and does not legitimise any Russian claim to sovereignty over Ukrainian territory; deplores the forced participation of Ukrainian citizens in the staged electoral process through coercion, intimidation, military presence and forced passportisation; emphasises that these actions only demonstrate Russia's intentions behind its full-scale invasion of Ukraine – raging imperialism and the desire to erase Ukrainian statehood as such;
7. Rejects equally the organisation of voting in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova and in the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia regions of Georgia; reaffirms its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia within their internationally recognised borders;
8. Highlights that Russia's defeat in its war of aggression against Ukraine, the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the ending of Russia's imperial ambitions are essential conditions for creating the possibility of a fundamental political change towards genuine democracy in Russia; reiterates that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its systematic repression at home are mutually reinforcing elements of the political regime in the Kremlin;

9. Calls for targeted restrictive measures against Russian electoral officials, judges, prosecutors, occupation authorities and other individuals directly responsible for organising the staged electoral process in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, as well as against members of the Central Election Commission and regional electoral commissions responsible for electoral fraud, and newly elected State Duma deputies not yet listed, in particular those who served in the invasion forces or occupation administrations; calls for Schengen-wide entry bans on all such individuals;
10. Calls on the Member States to use universal jurisdiction against State Duma deputies suspected of war crimes, including Nursultan Mussagaleev; stresses that a parliamentary mandate provides no immunity from prosecution for crimes under international law;
11. Expresses grave concern over the increasing militarisation of Russian society, including the presence of 46 participants in Russia's war against Ukraine in the new State Duma; calls, therefore, on the Member States to urgently and substantially strengthen their defence capabilities and military readiness, and ensure preparedness for potential Russian aggression or other hostile actions; stresses that the staged electoral process in Russia took place in the context of Russia's increasingly aggressive and frequent sabotage operations, cyberattacks, attacks on critical infrastructure, and other hostile actions on the territory of the EU;
12. Notes that the Kremlin used its embassies and polling points at EU external border crossings to extend its electoral apparatus to Russian citizens resident in the EU; calls on the Member States to treat such activity as part of Russia's operations toolbox, to restrict such activity, and to apply strict residence and security screening to participants where national law allows;
13. Condemns the systematic, long-standing destruction of political pluralism in Russia, including the exclusion and persecution of opposition candidates, the repression of anti-war political activity, and the stifling of independent media and civil society;
14. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all individuals imprisoned in Russia for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association or political participation, and for the dropping of politically motivated charges against opposition politicians, journalists, civil society representatives and anti-war activists;
15. Stresses that Russian democratic forces abroad will be credible partners only if they unambiguously support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, accountability and reparations; notes that participation in Kremlin-organised voting abroad was marginal;
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Member States, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and the Russian authorities.