



Plenary sitting

B10-0488/2026

19.10.2026

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security (2026/2939(RSP))

Adam Bielan, Jacek Ozdoba, Rihards Kols, Tobiasz Bocheński, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Alberico Gambino, Ivaylo Valchev, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Nikola Bartůšek, Carlo Fidanza, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Marlena Małąg, Waldemar Buda, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Emmanouil Fragkos
on behalf of the ECR Group

**European Parliament resolution on the escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security
(2026/2939(RSP))**

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its resolution of 16 December 2025 on relations between the EU and Saudi Arabia¹,
 - having regard to its previous resolutions on the situation in Yemen,
 - having regard to the recent statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on Houthi threats against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
 - having regard to the G7 Statement of 22 September 2026 on Bab al-Mandab and Navigational Rights and Freedoms,
 - having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia reignited in the summer of 2026 amid the widespread fallout of the Iran war; whereas the escalation of Houthi attacks has widened the Yemen conflict into a regional security crisis;
- B. whereas on 13 July 2026 the Houthis launched a ballistic missile attack on southern Saudi Arabia in response to an alleged Saudi airstrike on the international airport in Sana'a that is used by Iran to send Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel, military advisers, and missile and drone equipment into Yemen; whereas on 20 July 2026, the Houthis announced a maritime and aerial embargo against Saudi Arabia;
- C. whereas since July 2026, the Houthis repeatedly carried out dozens of missile and drone attacks on Saudi soil;
- D. whereas at least 13 people were killed and 308 were injured when a Houthi missile purposely hit Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport on 10 October 2026; whereas, according to the Saudi civil aviation authority, the Houthi's attack of 10 October 2026 killed four Saudis, two Bangladeshi nationals and one citizen each from the United States, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Palestine and Sudan; whereas on 11 October 2026 a second missile hit the airport, leaving one person dead and 11 wounded;
- E. whereas on 15 October 2026, the Houthis hit the headquarters of the Saudi state-owned oil company Aramco in Dhahran in an overnight strike, causing extensive damage;
- F. whereas on 15 October 2026, the Houthis fired missiles at the Yemeni presidential

¹ OJ C, C/2026/2149, 6.5.2026, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2026/2149/oj>.

palace complex in the southern city of Aden, killing five people;

- G. whereas on 19 October 2026 at least 53 people were killed and 200 were injured in an attack by the Houthis on a government security forces training camp in Yemen's Shabwa province;
- H. whereas the recent escalation follows weeks of fighting between the Iran-backed Houthis and the Saudi-backed government of Yemen, shattering a four-year period of relative calm in the country's civil war;
- I. whereas following advances along Yemen's Red Sea coast, including the seizure of a number of islands including the strategic Perim Island, the Houthis have intensified missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, targeting airports and energy infrastructure, while threatening commercial shipping near the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait, a chokepoint for global shipping at the southern entrance to the Red Sea; whereas Saudi-backed forces recaptured key areas around the strait in early October 2026;
- J. whereas the Houthis vowed to forge ahead with attacks on Saudi Arabia's airports and oil facilities;
- K. whereas earlier in 2026, the Houthis entered the Iran war by firing a barrage of ballistic missiles at southern Israel; whereas in the months since, the group's advances along the Red Sea are widely considered to serve the interests of Iran;
- L. whereas in response to the Israel-Hamas war, the Yemeni militia launched several strikes on shipping vessels in the Red Sea, disrupting global trade in late 2023 and the early months of 2024; whereas the United States and the UK joined forces in January 2024 for a series of strikes on Houthi targets across Yemen in retaliation for the attacks on unarmed vessels; whereas weeks after the strikes began, a ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis was reached via Omani mediation;
- M. whereas the Houthis are an Islamist political and military group from northern Yemen that are widely considered to be part of the Iranian-led 'axis of resistance' against Israel, the United States and the wider West – along with Hamas and Hezbollah;
- N. whereas civil war broke out in Yemen in 2014 after the Houthis seized Sana'a, forcing the government to flee to the southern city of Aden; whereas since then, the group has been engaged in fighting against a Saudi-led coalition supporting Yemen's government;
- O. whereas an estimated 70-80 % of Yemen's population live in Houthi-controlled territory; whereas the Houthis have weaponised humanitarian aid and prevented civilians from accessing it;
- P. whereas the UN World Food Programme (WFP) warned that escalating conflict in Yemen has cut off life-saving assistance to 800 000 people and that in 2026, an estimated 22.3 million people – over half the population – require humanitarian assistance, including 5.2 million internally displaced people (IDPs). whereas since 2015, the EU has contributed almost EUR 1.5 billion to address the Yemeni crisis, including over EUR 1 billion in humanitarian aid;

- Q. whereas a stable, peaceful Yemen with a fully functioning Yemeni Government is critical to the country's future and regional peace and security;
- R. whereas the Iranian regime provides financial, military and logistical support to terrorist organisations and armed groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, contributing to regional instability and posing threats to international security;
- S. whereas credible reports have shown that the Houthis have been transformed into a powerful military organisation by the transfer of weapons, material, assistance and training from the IRGC, Lebanon's Hezbollah movement and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias; whereas the Houthis have developed their military capabilities in recent years to become one of Iran's most powerful allies, notably after the fall of Assad and with the weakening of Hezbollah; whereas the Houthis have also used the four-year truce in Yemen to expand domestic drone manufacturing and diversify weapons supply chains with Tehran's support;
- T. whereas recent reports show that Houthi militants are attempting to produce their own advanced medium-range ballistic missiles, a variant of the Kheibar Shekan Iranian precision-guided missile, using parts delivered by China; whereas Anthropic announced in September that an operative cell based in northern Yemen had used its Claude AI assistant to help develop software for advanced missiles;
- U. whereas continued escalation risks drawing in external powers, worsening Yemen's humanitarian crisis and further undermining regional stability; whereas the Houthis' actions have caused renewed concern about disruption of world oil supplies as the Bab al-Mandab Strait became an important route for oil exports from Saudi Arabia since the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz;
- V. whereas an escalation in the region, combined with the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, has far-reaching implications for maritime security, global trade and energy prices and security;
- W. whereas growing ties between the Houthis and Somalia's al-Shabaab since early 2025, largely involving arms shipments and Houthi training of terrorists, could turn Red Sea instability into a more dangerous security threat for Africa and could also threaten freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden;
- X. whereas the crisis, which first emerged in Strait of Hormuz and now in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is creating major difficulties for EU economies, and therefore for European citizens; whereas the EU should play a much greater role than it has so far in trying to bring about peace;
- Y. whereas the EU Naval Force's (EUNAVFOR) operation ASPIDES remains firmly committed to protecting freedom of navigation for all in the Red Sea and surrounding international waters, in line with its defensive mandate and operation plan; whereas escort operations as part of operation ASPIDES are becoming even more crucial given the dangerous escalation by the Houthis; whereas, on 19 September 2026, the VP/HR sent a letter to the Member States calling for the reinforcement of operation ASPIDES in the Red Sea with additional naval and air assets, including enhanced close-protection capabilities;

- Z. whereas on 23 September 2026, the Council agreed to double EU support to the Djibouti Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility, reflecting the strengthening of the EU-Djibouti partnership in the field of security and defence and reinforcing the EU's support for Djibouti's efforts to enhance maritime security in the region;
- AA. whereas Red Sea security is particularly important for Africa and disrupted shipping and rising freight and insurance costs translate into higher prices for imported grain, fuel and fertiliser across the continent; whereas disruptions in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz are driving up energy and food prices; whereas, according to the WFP, the Middle East conflict has pushed an additional 6.1 million people into acute food insecurity, with another 45 million at risk of acute hunger;
- BB. whereas the Council Decision of July 2025 authorised the European Commission and the VP/HR to open negotiations for individual strategic partnership agreements with the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
- CC. whereas Saudi Arabia is a key bilateral and regional partner for the EU; whereas it is important to deepen this cooperation towards a strategic partnership that aims to strengthen bilateral relations and promote cooperation in various sectors, including defence and energy;
- DD. whereas the second summit between the EU and the Gulf Cooperation Council, originally planned for 24 October 2026 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, has been postponed due to the escalation in the region;
1. Strongly condemns the Houthi attacks on the airport in Riyadh and all other Houthi attacks which targeted civilian and economic infrastructure; expresses its full solidarity with Saudi Arabia and with the families of the victims; underlines that attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are unacceptable and must stop immediately; calls on the Houthis to immediately end all attacks inside and outside Yemen, including attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 2722 (2024) and 2826 (2026);
 2. Underlines that the situation in the region remains very delicate and supports all efforts to reduce tensions and pursue diplomatic solutions;
 3. Expresses grave concern that ongoing disruptions to maritime trade routes in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz are directly contributing to rising global energy prices by disrupting oil and gas supplies, increasing shipping and insurance costs and exacerbating market volatility; underlines the adverse consequences for EU households, businesses and economic competitiveness; stresses the urgent need to safeguard freedom of navigation and restore the security of international maritime trade routes;
 4. Reiterates the key importance of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait; is extremely concerned about the impact on energy supplies, in terms of both flows and costs, of the current situation in the region; underlines that it must be countered at all costs, as it has repercussions for all countries, including EU Member States;

5. Highlights that Saudi Arabia is a key country in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East; underlines that Saudi Arabia is also the largest oil producer in the region, and that oil is an energy resource that is closely linked to the economic consequences that are being witnessed;
6. Calls on the EU and its Member States to continue to work with their partners in the region to reduce tensions and foster stability and freedom of navigation in the area, and to operate within the framework of cooperation with NATO allies in order to contain the escalation and safeguard international stability;
7. Calls for stronger foreign and security cooperation in the light of regional escalations; stresses that the growing risk of conflict spillover in the Middle East requires a coherent approach rather than sole reliance on ad hoc coalitions;
8. Stresses the importance of ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea; in this context, calls for the strengthening and, where necessary, further extension of operation ASPIDES, while ensuring that its mandate, resources and capabilities remain commensurate with the evolving threat; welcomes the recent indications by some Member States of their willingness to provide additional naval vessels to reinforce EUNAVFOR's operation ASPIDES; calls for these indications to be translated into concrete commitments without delay;
9. Highlights that the ability to disrupt or influence global logistics flows and supply chains has become one of the main instruments of strategic pressure exploited by hostile actors to pursue geopolitical objectives without resorting to open armed conflict, posing a direct challenge to the economic security, industrial competitiveness and strategic resilience of the EU and its Member States;
10. Highlights that the ongoing crises and instability in the Middle East are having increasingly significant repercussions for the security and stability of the Mediterranean region, exacerbating geopolitical tensions, regional instability and the growing range of hybrid and cross-border security threats, particularly those affecting maritime security, freedom of navigation and the resilience of critical maritime and subsea infrastructure; stresses that these developments further aggravate the security challenges along NATO's Southern Flank and underlines the close interconnection between the stability of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel; expresses concern that the spillover effects of regional conflicts, including heightened strategic competition, terrorism, irregular migration and other transnational threats, may directly undermine the security, stability and resilience of the EU and its Member States;
11. Urges a de-escalation and calls for a negotiated solution under the auspices of the United Nations, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2140 (2014), 2216 (2015), and 2801 (2025), in particular the enforcement of the targeted arms embargo against Yemeni individuals and entities;
12. Calls for an end to all external support for the Houthis; condemns Tehran's role in arming, providing military-industrial training, funding and directing the Houthis and calls on Iran to end its arming of and support for the Houthis, which is in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1747 (2007), 2140 (2014) and 2216 (2015); expresses deep concern about reports that China has emerged as a commercial source for the

development of advanced ballistic missiles and about reported use of Anthropic's Claude AI platform for missile software development;

13. Recognises that a prospective EU-Saudi Arabia strategic partnership agreement offers an opportunity to advance the EU's strategic interests, contribute to regional stability and strengthen bilateral cooperation, particularly in the areas of energy, trade, investment and security; calls for constructive and sustained engagement by both parties with a view to making timely progress towards the conclusion of an ambitious and comprehensive agreement;
14. Recognises the opportunity and the converging interests for EU-Saudi Arabian collaboration on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor Initiative (IMEC); emphasises the strategic importance of IMEC as a transformative driver of regional connectivity, economic integration and geopolitical cooperation;
15. Expresses grave concern at the continuing decline of the humanitarian and political situation in Yemen and its devastating impact on civilians; welcomes Saudi Arabia's substantial contribution to humanitarian aid for Yemen; notes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's commitments to avoid civilian casualties and protect civilian infrastructure in accordance with the principles of international humanitarian law;
16. Believes that sustainable and inclusive peace in Yemen can only be achieved through negotiations with the meaningful participation of all parties; supports the mandate of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen to facilitate a peaceful, inclusive, Yemeni-led political transition, ensuring international support for stability in Yemen;
17. Deplores reports of the use of child soldiers in Yemen by the Houthis and reminds all parties of their responsibilities under international laws and conventions;
18. Encourages Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to closely cooperate in working with their Yemeni allies on a realistic strategy for deterring the Houthis;
19. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Shura Council and the Government of Yemen.