



Plenary sitting

B10-0489/2026

19.10.2026

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security (2026/2939(RSP))

Yannis Maniatis, Hana Jalloul Muro, Nacho Sánchez Amor
on behalf of the S&D Group

**European Parliament resolution on the escalation of Houthi attacks and implications for regional security
(2026/2939(RSP))**

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the security situation in the Red Sea, and Iran,
- having regard to the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 and 16 October 2026,
- having regard to the statement by the President of the European Council, António Costa, of 12 October 2026 on the continued Houthi attacks against civilian infrastructure in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
- having regard to the statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, of 9 October 2026 expressing the EU's full solidarity with the people of Saudi Arabia,
- having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Kaja Kallas, on Houthi attacks against shipping and against Saudi Arabia, including those of 23 July 2026 and of 8 October 2026,
- having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/583 of 8 February 2024 on a European Union maritime security operation to safeguard freedom of navigation in relation to the Red Sea crisis (EUNAVFOR ASPIDES)¹, and to the Council decision extending its mandate until 28 February 2027²,
- having regard to Council Decision 2014/932/CFSP of 18 December 2014³ and Council Regulation (EU) No 1352/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Yemen⁴,
- having regard to the joint statement of the European Parliament – Gulf Cooperation Council Speakers' Conference of 16 October 2026,
- having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2817(2026) of 11 March 2026 condemning the Iranian attacks against the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,

¹ OJ L, 2024/583, 12.2.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/583/oj>.

² Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/439 of 23 February 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/583 on a European Union maritime security operation to safeguard freedom of navigation in relation to the Red Sea crisis (EUNAVFOR ASPIDES) (OJ L, 2026/439, 24.2.2026, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/439/oj>).

³ OJ L 365, 19.12.2014, p. 147, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2014/932/oj>.

⁴ OJ L 365, 19.12.2014, p. 60, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/1352/oj>.

- having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the conflict in Yemen reignited in July 2026; whereas the attacks launched by the Houthi militias during the wave of escalation resulted in the deaths of more than 250 Yemeni civilians; whereas the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported that more than 200 000 civilians have been displaced, deepening one of the world's worst humanitarian crises;
- B. whereas, since mid-July 2026, the Iran-backed Houthi movement has launched repeated ballistic missile, cruise missile and drone attacks against the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
- C. whereas these attacks have deliberately and repeatedly targeted civilians, civilian infrastructure, economic assets and oil facilities across 10 Saudi cities and regions, namely Riyadh, Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, Najran, Taif, Yanbu, the Eastern Province, Mecca and Medina; whereas the targets have included airports such as King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and Abha International Airport, as well as a school in Najran, residential areas in the southern regions of Asir, Jazan and Najran, and energy facilities in Riyadh, Khurais and Rabigh; whereas on 3 October 2026 a Houthi strike caused large fires at an Aramco facility near Riyadh;
- D. whereas on 8 September 2026 attacks on four southern Saudi cities reportedly wounded 73 people; whereas between 5 and 11 October 2026 the attacks on Saudi airports killed 19 civilians and injured 364, including nationals of several countries; whereas King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has been targeted on 20 separate occasions since 1 October 2026, forcing the suspension of its operations until 17 October 2026; whereas many international airlines, including European carriers, have suspended flights to Saudi Arabia;
- E. whereas the Houthis have publicly declared Saudi airspace to be within their area of operations and have warned international airlines against flying over it; whereas several international carriers have suspended flights to Riyadh;
- F. whereas on 18 September 2026 a Houthi attack struck an Italian Eurofighter stationed at a Saudi air base in Taif;
- G. whereas over the past three years Houthi forces have attacked more than 100 commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, severely disrupting international maritime commerce; whereas the Houthis have declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, have attacked Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea since 22 July 2026, and in September 2026 seized control of Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline, including the Bab al-Mandab Strait; whereas this includes the occupation of the strategic island of Perim (Mayyun) and the coastal towns of Mokha and Dhubab, enabling the imposition of a systematic maritime blockade on commercial traffic; whereas the Red Sea has become an alternative for international trade navigation while shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted;
- H. whereas the simultaneous disruption of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz affects the two main maritime corridors linking Europe with the Gulf and Asia; whereas the price of Brent crude rose above USD 100 a barrel

following the attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure; whereas the rerouting of vessels has direct consequences for EU energy prices, inflation, industrial supply chains and the competitiveness of European, and in particular Mediterranean, ports;

- I. whereas the VP/HR has described the Houthi blockade threats as a dangerous escalation and a direct threat to regional stability, has called the attacks on shipping illegal and unacceptable, and on 8 October 2026 announced that the EU is expanding EUNAVFOR ASPIDES;
- J. whereas the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission expressed the EU's full solidarity with the people of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf partners, stating that targeting civilian infrastructure is unacceptable and calling on Iran's proxies to stop their reckless and violent actions; whereas on 11 October 2026, in a telephone call with the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the VP/HR reaffirmed the EU's condemnation of the attack on King Khalid International Airport, stressing that indiscriminate attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure cannot be justified and expressing the EU's solidarity with Saudi Arabia;
- K. whereas the EU Member States have historically affirmed, alongside the United Kingdom, their firm commitment to the security and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia;
- L. whereas the UN Special Envoy for Yemen has called the attack on Riyadh airport a serious escalation posing a grave threat to regional security; whereas the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League have also condemned the attacks and expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia; whereas on 11 October 2026 the R4 Group of countries – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye – issued a joint statement condemning the ongoing Houthi attacks on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, describing them as a dangerous escalation, and pledging full support for all legitimate measures taken by Saudi Arabia to counter the attacks and deter further threats, in accordance with the UN Charter and international law;
- M. whereas the Houthis continue to detain 71 members of UN personnel and staff of civil society organisations;
- N. whereas according to the Yemeni Ministry of Human Rights, 100 children were recruited by the Houthi militias in September 2026 alone, and these militias continue their practices of attracting, recruiting and deploying children to combat fronts;
- O. whereas the Houthis receive military, financial and technical support from the Islamic Republic of Iran, in violation of the arms embargo established by UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015); whereas UN Security Council Resolution 2624 (2022) already described the Houthis as a terrorist group;
- P. whereas the Houthis are part of the network of armed groups sponsored by Iran, which also includes Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed militias in Iraq and Syria; whereas Hezbollah has provided the Houthis with training, military expertise, and media and propaganda support; whereas these groups coordinate their actions and share weapons supply chains originating in Iran; whereas the military wing of Hezbollah has been

included in the EU terrorist list since 2013;

- Q. whereas the proliferation of non-state armed groups and militias operating outside state control undermines the sovereignty and stability of states across the region, including Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, and is one of the main drivers of regional escalation;
- R. whereas the United States has designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organisation; whereas the Yemeni Government has approved a draft law designating the Houthis as a terrorist group; whereas the EU has already listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation, but has not yet listed the Houthis as such under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP⁵, despite calls from several Member States;
- S. whereas the Commission and the VP/HR have not yet presented a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, despite the profound changes in the regional security environment and repeated calls from Parliament;
1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Houthi missile and drone attacks against the territory of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in particular the deliberate targeting of civilian airports, energy infrastructure, schools and residential areas; stresses that such attacks constitute flagrant violations of international law and international humanitarian law;
 2. Expresses its strong and unwavering solidarity with the people and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; reaffirms its firm commitment to the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia;
 3. Strongly condemns the Houthi ballistic missile attack of 15 October 2026 against the Al-Maashiq Presidential Palace in Aden, the seat of Yemen's internationally recognised government;
 4. Welcomes the statements by the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the VP/HR, including the VP/HR's direct expression of the EU's solidarity to the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs on 11 October 2026, as well as the condemnations issued by Member States; calls on the Council and the Member States to adopt formal Council conclusions condemning the attacks and setting out a common EU response;
 5. Welcomes the broad international condemnation of the attacks, including by the UN Security Council, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League, the R4 Group of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye, and numerous other governments; urges the international community to sustain its multilateral support for regional stability and humanitarian resilience, including across the Horn of Africa, promoting diplomatic de-escalation, adherence to international humanitarian law, and the cooperative protection of shared maritime spaces;
 6. Strongly condemns the declared Houthi naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, the attacks on energy shipping and on more than 100 commercial vessels in the Red Sea over the past

⁵ Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 3, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/compos/2001/931/oj>).

three years, and the seizure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait; recalls that freedom of navigation is a fundamental principle of international law under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; underlines the severe consequences of these attacks for global energy markets, supply chains and European citizens and businesses;

7. Expresses deep concern about the economic impact on the EU of the simultaneous disruption of navigation through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz; calls on the Commission to urgently assess the consequences for EU energy security and prices, inflation, industrial supply chains, maritime transport and ports, and to present contingency measures, including the diversification of energy supplies;
8. Welcomes the decision to expand EUNAVFOR ASPIDES; calls on the Member States to urgently provide sufficient vessels and the necessary air defence and surveillance assets; calls on the Council to assess, in the forthcoming strategic review, whether the operation's mandate and rules of engagement remain appropriate to the scale of the threat; encourages close coordination between the Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition and operations conducted under the EU common security and defence policy in order to protect shared maritime routes and energy supplies;
9. Condemns the destabilising role of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which provides the Houthis with weapons, missile and drone technology, training and financing in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015); calls on the Council to extend restrictive measures to all persons and entities involved in the supply of weapons and components to the Houthis and to strengthen the enforcement of the UN arms embargo;
10. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to adopt a comprehensive approach aimed at reducing Iran's destabilising influence in the region and at working with regional partners to cut off the supply routes of weapons to Iran-backed groups;
11. Strongly condemns the coordination between the Houthis, Hezbollah and other Iran-backed armed groups, which multiplies the threats to regional security and to European interests;
12. Stresses that lasting stability in the Middle East requires the disarmament and demobilisation of all militias and non-state armed groups and the restoration of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force; supports the efforts of the legitimate Government of Yemen in this regard, as well as those of the Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah in line with UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006);
13. Calls on the Council to designate the Houthi movement, including its leadership, military and security apparatus, as a terrorist organisation by adding it to the EU terrorist list under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001⁶, without further delay;
14. Calls for the dismantling of all channels of financing for the Houthi movement; calls on

⁶ Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 70, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2001/2580/oj>).

the Council and the Member States to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to or controlled by the Houthis and their facilitators, to target the networks used to finance them, including networks engaging in the smuggling of oil and other commodities, and in illicit money transfers, and to ensure close cooperation between financial intelligence units, Europol and Eurojust; calls on the Commission to assess the inclusion of Houthi-linked financing in the EU's anti-money laundering framework;

15. Insists that inclusion of the Houthis in the EU terrorist list must be accompanied by robust and clearly defined humanitarian exemptions, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2664 (2022), so that it does not impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Yemen;
16. Expresses its deep concern about the humanitarian situation in Yemen, including the displacement of more than 200 000 people since June 2026; calls on all parties to ensure full, safe, rapid and unhindered humanitarian access; demands the immediate and unconditional release of all detained UN personnel and staff of civil society organisations; calls for the EU and the international community to step up targeted humanitarian aid and regional development funding to enhance human security and alleviate the structural causes of displacement in local coastal communities along the Red Sea and the wider Horn of Africa;
17. Deplores the excessive delay in the presentation of a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy; calls on the Commission and the VP/HR to present such a strategy without delay; calls for Parliament to be fully involved in its preparation; emphasises the urgent need for the EU and the international community to address, in parallel, the severe socio-economic and humanitarian impacts of this crisis on the people of the Horn of Africa;
18. Reiterates its support both for the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen towards an inclusive, negotiated, Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned political settlement, and for the legitimate Government of Yemen;
19. Considers that the partnership between the EU and the Gulf countries is a lasting anchor of stability in the Middle East region and beyond; urges the forthcoming EU-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit to give strong political momentum to this shared interest and to build a deeper strategic partnership, including a parliamentary dimension, grounded in a common commitment to shared values, the rules-based international order, human rights and pluralism; stresses, in this regard, the importance of strengthening people-to-people contacts, including through increased mobility and cultural and educational exchanges;
20. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Government and the Shura Council of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Government of Yemen.

