

Amendment 2

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on behalf of the ESN Group

Report**A10-0239/2026****Nicola Zingaretti**

A new co-ownership for the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations – the Pact for the Mediterranean
(2026/2035(INI))

Motion for a resolution (Rule 188(3) of the Rules of Procedure) replacing non-legislative motion for a resolution A10-0239/2026

European Parliament resolution on new co-ownership for the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations – the Pact for the Mediterranean

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 February 2021 entitled ‘Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood – A new Agenda for the Mediterranean’ (JOIN(2021)0002),
- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 October 2025 entitled ‘The Pact for the Mediterranean – One Sea, One Pact, One Future’ (JOIN(2025)0026),
- having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 November 2025 on the Pact for the Mediterranean,
- having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the Mediterranean is of strategic importance to the Member States in terms of security, trade, energy, transport connectivity and access to raw materials; whereas stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean directly affect European citizens;
- B. whereas previous cooperation frameworks have not been thoroughly assessed and discussed on the basis of their actual results and outcomes; whereas institutional expansion and increased public expenditure do not in themselves provide solutions to the Mediterranean region’s challenges;
- C. whereas illegal migration, including the instrumentalisation of migration, ineffective

returns and readmission, human trafficking and migrant smuggling undermine EU security and public confidence in the EU's cooperation with southern partners;

- D. whereas poverty, limited employment opportunities and the departure of skilled young people can weaken the development prospects of partner countries; whereas cooperation can help people build a future in their countries of origin;
 - E. whereas fair market access and legal certainty for EU investors, as well as resilient Euro-Mediterranean supply chains, can promote economic development;
1. Stresses that the implementation of the Pact for the Mediterranean must fully respect the competences, sovereignty and national priorities of the Member States as laid down in the Treaties;
 2. Stresses that decisions concerning legal migration pathways and the admission of third-country nationals for employment must remain the competence of Member States; underlines that any legal migration channels must remain limited, targeted and fully aligned with the labour market needs and the absorption capacities of the Member States;
 3. Insists that effective border control, the prevention of illegal migration, the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and readmissions be among the key priorities of the partnership with the Mediterranean; calls, therefore, on the Commission to prioritise related funding via the multiannual financial framework, by applying conditionality, under which sustained and verifiable cooperation on readmission and return constitutes a key criterion for programming and disbursement;
 4. Insists on the suspension of financial assistance and cooperation programmes benefiting the authorities of partner countries that persistently refuse to cooperate on readmission and the prevention of illegal migration;
 5. Calls for the EU and the Member States to avoid policies that create incentives for illegal migration; expresses concern that large-scale regularisation measures and expectations of residence or access to social benefits may encourage further illegal arrivals; calls for these effects to be assessed when designing migration policies;
 6. Deeply regrets the loss of life in the Mediterranean; emphasises, however, that these deaths could have been prevented if the EU and its Member States had adopted an effective zero-tolerance migration policy that does not create the pull factors that make migrants risk their lives on unseaworthy vessels;
 7. Calls for effective oversight of the activities of private vessels and non-governmental organisations in the Mediterranean and for evidence-based investigations into the suspected facilitation of migrant smuggling or human trafficking;
 8. Calls on the Commission to ensure policy coherence between the EU Talent Pool and related partnerships, skills and labour mobility schemes, the recognition of qualifications and the Mediterranean University; underlines that the efforts to address labour and skills shortages in the EU should not exacerbate brain drain in Mediterranean partner countries or undermine their economic development and the provision of

essential public services;

9. Calls for appropriate safeguards, reciprocal investment commitments and measurable indicators to assess the impact of these initiatives on skills retention, knowledge transfer, local employment opportunities and the prevention of irregular migration;
10. Invites Mediterranean partners to capitalise on the skills, knowledge and competencies acquired by returning students and migrants and to foster conditions conducive to quality employment and entrepreneurship, thereby mitigating brain drain and strengthening the development and competitiveness of their labour markets;
11. Supports the modernisation of trade relations and the promotion of investment through mutually beneficial agreements, particularly in sectors offering clear gains for EU and Mediterranean businesses; calls for a transparent, fair and competitive business environment that facilitates access for EU companies to the Mediterranean regional markets;
12. Emphasises the need to strengthen legal protection for investors, ensure predictable rules and simplify domestic laws and administrative procedures; supports the development of local private enterprises and local supply around European industrial investments and value chains;
13. Calls for priority to be given to economically viable projects that improve transport links, support productive investment and strengthen trade between the Member States and Mediterranean partners;
14. Invites the Commission to prioritise private investments for better connections between ports, railways, roads and logistics facilities, including links with European transport networks; stresses the importance of developing infrastructure that improves the resilience and competitiveness of the Member States and creates employment and economic opportunities for European taxpayers;
15. Calls for pragmatic cooperation on energy security and reliable access to raw materials, based on diversification and commercially viable investment; stresses that such cooperation should reduce strategic dependencies for the EU;
16. Notes that the appointment of a Commissioner for the Mediterranean and the creation of the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf led to additional bureaucracy and the proliferation of initiatives for the region at the expense of European taxpayers;
17. Calls for any future allocations to be justified by demonstrated needs and results, for their value for money to be proven and for them to serve the strategic interests of the EU and its Member States; rejects an approach in which success is measured primarily by the number of initiatives launched or the amount of public money committed;
18. Calls for a thorough audit of the projects under the 2021 Agenda for the Mediterranean to draw lessons for improved accountability;
19. Cautions against the creation of additional governance structures or administrative

mechanisms that would duplicate existing initiatives, increase bureaucracy or transfer further decision-making powers away from the Member States;

20. Invites the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to report regularly to Parliament on the implementation of the pact, including on expenditure, investment outcomes, employment creation, connectivity improvements, border-management cooperation and returns and readmission; insists that programmes failing to meet agreed objectives be reviewed, redirected or discontinued;
21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

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